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Abstract This paper attempts to shed light on the nexus
of relationships existing between failure, bankruptcy,
institutional context, and local characteristics on one
hand and entrepreneurship, firm survival, and perfor-
mance on the other. The aim is to provide a larger
vantage point from which to read the research included
in this issue with the overall ambition to contribute to a
better understanding of our entrepreneurial societies and
the role of failure within markets. In this respect, the
focus here is mainly on the institutions governing the
bankruptcy procedures which do much more than sim-
ply regulating the exit of insolvent firms and protecting
creditors’ investments, minimizing the social cost of
failures. They set up the revolving doors through which
creditors can reinvest the recovered capital in new en-
trepreneurial projects and failed entrepreneurs can bring
back to the market their skills and their entrepreneurial
spirit for fostering new and hopefully successful ven-
tures. Therefore, by managing bankruptcy, the
institutions are not only protecting the economy. In-
stead, they have become a tool of economic policy,
devoted to the delicate issue of regulating a physiolog-
ical event to the market while avoiding too much waste
of resources. In a more positive perspective, managing
insolvency and failure is also a mean to strengthen
competitiveness and growth, making it possible to stim-
ulate the market in reshuffling skills and resources into
new activities. A deeper understanding can in turn con-
tribute to the implementation of better andmore efficient
policies by integrating bankruptcy as a natural compo-
nent of firm and market life.
Keywords Entrepreneurship . Failure . Bankruptcy.
Insolvency. Firms
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1 Introduction
BEver tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail
again. Fail better.^ Samuel Beckett’s words in
BWorstward Ho,^ published in 1983, which echo
how his early artistic failures turned into great poetry,
sound like a life lesson. This tenet fully applies to
virtually every domain of human activity, especially
in markets where it might represent an aspiring en-
trepreneur who tries, fails, tries again, and eventually
succeeds. In effect, the path of most successful en-
trepreneurs is marked by a number of failures so that
even though we cannot infer any causal relationship
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from these failures (and it would be dangerous to do
so), we can use the rule of thumb to assess that a great
many accomplishments very often required a previ-
ous number of trials and relative failures. In a sense,
this concept is embedded in many of the definitions
of an entrepreneur (Ebner, 2006), which is an indi-
vidual who not only discovers new successful com-
binations following Schumpeter Mark I (Schumpeter
1911) but also someone who can manage uncertainty
(Knight, 1921).
However, since failing is a possibility for any
entrepreneur, it represents a financial and psycholog-
ical cost to the entrepreneur, his/her family, creditors
and other stakeholders and, what is more, to society
as a whole. For this reason, the cost of firm failure
albeit functional to the market and to the economy
should be minimized, calling for a better understand-
ing of its possible causes. Accordingly, flourishing
literature on failure and insolvency has become a
regular companion to the literature on firms and
entrepreneurship, entangling the topic with several
nuances. A first stream of contributions, led by the
seminal paper by Altman (1968), focuses on critical
financial ratios that can help entrepreneurs and
funders predict insolvency (Dimitras et al. 1996). A
second stream of literature aims to determine the
causes of firm bankruptcy by looking at variables
beyond those that come from accounting books
(Bottazzi, Grazzi, Secchi, and Tamagni, 2011;
Lukason and Hoffman, 2014; (Lukason & Hoffman,
2014) Mueller and Stegmaier 2014). Other studies
additionally propose methodologies and tools to im-
prove the prediction of firm failures (Barboza et al.
2017, Zhao et al. 2017).
It is quite evident that most of these papers show the
common trait of looking inside the firm in search of
predictor signals, as if bankruptcy were something re-
lating to the firm’s operations and its internal character-
istics, essentially neglecting the fact that firms do not
exist in vitro, and they interplay in an environment in
which great momentum is given by the external envi-
ronment, including the institutional context. They rather
seek to provide Bother things equal^ solutions.
The papers included in this special issue of course
not only recognize the importance of the internal
characteristics of the firms in determining success or
the failure but also stress the importance of properly
considering the impact of the external features, not
only in establ ishing the boundaries for the
entrepreneurial action but also in specifically provid-
ing incentives to the entrepreneurs. In this respect, the
institutions governing the bankruptcy procedures do
much more than simply regulating the exit of insol-
vent firms and protecting creditors’ investments, min-
imizing the social cost of failures. They set up the
revolving doors through which creditors can reinvest
the recovered capital in new entrepreneurial projects
and failed entrepreneurs can bring back to the market
their skills and their entrepreneurial spirit for foster-
ing new and hopefully successful ventures. Therefore,
by managing bankruptcy, the institutions are not only
protecting the economy, but rather they have become
a tool of economic policy, devoted to the delicate
issue of regulating on one hand a physiological event
to the market while avoiding too much waste of re-
sources, and on the other hand making it possible to
stimulate the market itself in reshuffling skills and
resources into new activities.
In this respect, the institutions, by managing bank-
ruptcy, are no longer devoted to simply protect the
economy or even to somewhat setting limits on the
behavior of failed entrepreneurs, but rather operating
the delicate issue of regulating a physiological event
with the general aim of providing the proper stimuli to
the market, for fostering as soon as possible the
reshuffling of skills and resources into new, hopefully
successful, entrepreneurial activities.
In other words, the institutional framework sets up
part of the incentives affecting entrepreneurial action
and is thus relevant not only for failed entrepreneurs
but for the whole market. Today, the evolution of the
legal system that characterizes bankruptcy has a pro-
found impact on the dynamics of the creation of a firm
and its life cycle, and finally, the economic system. So,
for example, the limits on the responsibility of debtors
are strictly related to risk-taking behaviors and finally on
the promotion of entrepreneurship. We also argue that
entrepreneurs take advantage of this permissive view
and that new companies and SMEs, characterized by a
higher probability of failure, benefit from bankruptcy
laws at different stages of their life cycle.
On the whole, although we do not have any specific
normative aim, the papers gathered in this special issue
lead to practical recommendations and concrete busi-
ness propositions that may help entrepreneurs, stake-
holders, and business support organizations to deter-
mine and adopt the best performing strategies before,
during, and after bankruptcy.
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2 General framework: the metamorphosis
of bankruptcy procedure
It took a very long time to transform failure from a
pathology of the market, severely sanctioned, into a sort
of a natural phenomenon, functional to the economic
system and its dynamics. This change has been disrup-
tive not only for what can be defined the metamorphosis
of bankruptcy law but also for the policy supporting
entrepreneurship in the modern markets. Technically
speaking, bankruptcy law provides an institutional set-
ting for tackling failures in the market. More precisely, it
designs a procedure that should create a balance be-
tween debtor treatment, including her assets, and cred-
itors’ interests, while promoting the general social inter-
est.1 In different jurisdictions, distinct bankruptcy pro-
cedures are available for corporate and individual
debtors.2 To a large extent, the design of the procedure
depends on the political goal defined by the legislator so
that the impact of failures on the economy largely varies
according to whether it is more in favor of debtors or of
creditors.
Even before any de jure bankruptcy law, many soci-
eties issued de facto harsh bankruptcy measures against
insolvent debtors. In ancient Greece, if a man was
unable to repay a debt, he and his family, including
servants, were forced into Bdebt slavery,^ that is to say,
bonded labor, until they had provided enough labor to
permit the creditor to recoup their losses (Levinthal,
1919).3 An even harsher attitude towards failed entre-
preneurs appears in one of the first bankruptcy laws, the
Roman law of the XII Tables. There, bankruptcy was
ruled by means of the partes secanto, a drastic measure
implying not only the splitting of the patrimony of the
insolvent debtor among creditors but also his physical
dismemberment into small pieces as a warning to the
rest of the society. It is worth underlining that while
these cruel measures were trying give back to creditors
as much as possible of the debtor’s remaining patrimony
and conveying all the possible stigma to the failed
entrepreneur, the complementary outcome was to put
him/her in the condition of no longer practicing in the
market.
Many elements thus characterized the law: the cred-
itor protection, the social vengeance towards the wrong-
doer (at least this was the perception of the failed entre-
preneur), and also his/her elimination from the econom-
ic scene. For centuries, being a bankrupt entrepreneur
was an outlaw, deserving shame and the harshest pun-
ishment, as if the failed entrepreneur was a sort of
contagious infection to be cut out of the market and
society as soon as possible.
The association of the failure to a crime was for a
long time the rule as witnessed in the famous definition
attributed to Baldo degli Ubaldi, a legal scholar of the
fourth century illustrates: Bdecoctor ergo fraudator^
(Santarelli 1964; in English something such as Bto be
bankrupt equates to be a crook^). While the balance
between the first and the second issue experienced a
change across the years so that, for example, the subse-
quent blend of Roman law with the Barbarian law
shifted the emphasis from vengeance on the failed per-
son to debt recovery, the elimination of the failed entre-
preneur from the market remained as the necessary
common trait for a very long time. Therefore, although
across the centuries the Bphysical^ measure against the
failed merchant became softer, a clear tenet remained
unchanged: a bankrupt entrepreneur is an evil that must
be expunged from the economic system. Accordingly,
again as an example, in Florence or in Genua, the
Brotti^—i.e., failed—had their trading bench broken
(from which Bbanco rotto,^ hence bankruptcy) to con-
vey the clear message that they ought to avoid trade and
commerce in the future, following the idea that a failed
entrepreneur represented a danger to the economy and
the society (Guglielmucci, 2006).
In the subsequent centuries, the severe attitude to-
wards bankrupt entrepreneurs continued everywhere,
implying in many cases jail for debt, with the aim once
more of Bpunishing^ the failed entrepreneur and taking
him out of the market. In the meanwhile, increasing
attention was directed to the recovery of the lost assets
1 Bankruptcy law solves a collective action problem. When a debtor
becomes insolvent, creditors have incentives to engage in a Brun on the
bank,^ enforcing their individual claims as quickly as possible, even if
this results in a reduced overall value being obtained for the debtor’s
assets. In response, bankruptcy law provides a mandatory and orderly
mechanism for the realization of the insolvent’s assets (Jackson, 1982).
2 In the USA, Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings are
open both to individuals and to corporate debtors. However, many
countries have different procedures for individuals and corporations, or
distinguish according to whether the debtor is a Btrader^ (individual or
corporate) or a consumer. In addition to collective enforcement, bank-
ruptcy procedures open to individuals (Bpersonal bankruptcy law^)
serve important social functions of providing social insurance against
failure, and of punishing or rehabilitating financially distressed indi-
viduals (Adler et al. 2000).
3 A similar measure is found in a number of societies, like in the Code
of Hammurabi of Babylonia, in ancient Egypt, and with the ancient
Hebrews, as witnessed also by many Biblical references (Levinthal
1918).
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of creditors, which may have come from a slowly in-
creasing consciousness about the role of the legal incen-
tives for investors.
It was only in the second half of the nineteenth
century that most of the European countries moved
towards the mitigation of the severity of bankruptcy
law against debtors (Hautcoeur & Levratto, 2010,
2018; Sgard, 2006).4 Two concurring forces possi-
bly led to this novel attitude towards failed entre-
preneurs that brought about a deep transformation in
the understandings of the bankruptcy system. On
one hand, there was an increasing spread of the
moral sentiment that failure was not necessarily
equivalent to fault and that much of the entrepre-
neur’s good faith was dependent on luck rather than
on guiltiness. Of course, there can be a criminal
side, as in the case of fraudulent bankruptcy. How-
ever, in most cases, failed entrepreneurs do not have
any criminal intentions. On the other hand, a more
economic view emerged showing that the bankrupt-
cy system was setting incentives that have conse-
quences for behaviors. Some of them were to the
detriment of the creditors such as, for example,
debtors scared by the implications of bankruptcy
using extrajudicial agreements to hamper the credi-
tors or simply delaying the declaration of bankrupt-
cy (and then increasing their losses) in the vain hope
of escaping bankruptcy’s harshness (Hautcoeur & Di
Martino, 2013). Others were much more connected
with the discovery of the pivotal role of entrepre-
neurs as risk takers and economic innovators, and
how bankruptcy can affect negatively both sides, to
the detriment of not only potential investors but also
the economic system as a whole (Lee, Yamakawa,
Peng, & Barney, 2011; Peng, Yamakawa, & Lee,
2010).
Thus, a new consciousness started to emerge, seeing
bankruptcy procedure as the locus to fine tune the indi-
vidual interests of debtors and creditors, with the social
interest of keeping entrepreneurship and risk-taking
alive.
This change led to the mitigation of the Bseverity^ for
the debtor in two ways. First, some assets might be
exempted from the process. Universally, debtors are
entitled to retain living expenses, personal effects, and
the like.5 Secondly, many jurisdictions or at least many
courts allow a bankrupt entrepreneur to obtain a Bfresh
start,^ which after a certain timespan, permits the debtor
to discharge outstanding credit obligations and to
emerge from bankruptcy proceedings, making it possi-
ble to start new, hopefully successful entrepreneurial
activities. The legal change in turn affected the socio-
logical attitude towards failure so that the circumstance
of Bbeing bankrupt^ or Bhaving been bankrupt,^ once
viewed solely as a signal of financial irresponsibility and
general unreliability has now partially changed, al-
though the de facto social stigmatization is more diffi-
cult to totally remove than the de jure, and it varies
extensively across countries (Athreya, 2004).
Since the publication of the seminal paper by
Claessens and Klapper (2005), international compari-
sons over time show that the number of bankruptcies
varies tremendously between countries, but that com-
mon trends emerge. Doing business reports insist upon
the fact that easy access to bankruptcy procedures is
indicative of efficiency in financial distress resolution.
Many governments around the world have thus initiated
reforms in their bankruptcy regimes to open their pro-
cedures to a larger number of entrepreneurs and enter-
prises, diversifying the list of sectors allowed to file for
bankruptcies while implementing procedures opening
the possibilities for automatic stays. In today’s view,
entering a bankruptcy procedure is no longer seen, as
least within the law, as the final act terminating the failed
firms, but is often considered as a fundamental device, a
revolving door through which resources and capabilities
can be re-shuffled. The prevailing view is that failure is
inseparable from trial and, in an entrepreneurial society
(Audretsch, 2007), failure should be better accepted and
less costly to incentivize business creation. In most
OECD countries, failure and insolvency are thus facili-
tated, giving potential entrepreneurs more chances to
undertake their projects (Lee et al. 2007; Lee et al.
2011; Peng et al. 2010).
However, beside the enouncement in the law on the
books, much of the real perception depends also on the
laws in action, that is to say, how the regulations are
4 This institutional innovation concerning firm exit had an equivalent
on the entry side with the introduction of the limited liability principle
which is at the core of the modern corporation (Guinnane, Harris,
Lamoreaux, & Rosenthal, 2007; Mueller, 2003). See also note 5.
5 In France, the so-called patrimoine de la famille (family heritage and
wealth) was originally composed of the dower and nowadays is equiv-
alent to the minimum income necessary to live. It cannot be seized. In
the USA, debtors are also allowed to retain an interest in their homes,
although the maximum value of this Bhomestead exemption^ varies
from state to state.
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enforced and how effective the procedures are in the real
world.6
3 Financing, the first and primary link
between bankruptcy and entrepreneurship
One of the main results of the long and winding road
concerning bankruptcy doctrine is the awareness that
entrepreneurship and bankruptcy are in fact two faces of
the same coin. We can take as a striking example of the
interplay between starting and closing a business, two
leading entrepreneurs in the digital world, Shawn Fan-
ning and Shawn Parker, with accomplishments starting
companies such as Snocap, Rupture, Facebook, Spotify,
and Airtime.com. They were equally responsible for
perhaps the largest bankruptcy case in US history,7 the
Napster case, involving the first file sharing system,
which was heavily targeted by the major recording
companies until its shutdown.8 Despite this substantial
failure, the institutional system did not preempt them
from the possibility of new entrepreneurial activities.
The new consciousness is witnessed by a flourishing
number of academic papers and institutional reports
emphasizing that institutions influence economic
agents’ behavior and, as a consequence, entrepreneurial
action (Simmons et al. 2014). Some specifically focus
on bankruptcy procedures (Estrin et al. 2017, Lee et al.
2007). They not only show that creditor-friendly re-
gimes tend to be more favorable to firm creation than
debtor-friendly regimes but also provide evidence of the
interaction between personal and corporate insolvency
regimes.
Ideally, the studies included in this special issue try to
pursue the very same direction and present some new
results. In particular, our overall aim is to show that
bankruptcy affects firm creation and propensity in sev-
eral ways. Some are directly connected to financial
stakes and asset recovery, which has been intensively
studied in the literature (Eger 2001; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) Others depend on a
set of indirect yet still important transmission channels.
Let us recall first how a bankruptcy regime shapes
the relationship between a firm and its stakeholders,
among which lenders play a specific role. As pro-
viders of financial resources, banks are deeply in-
volved in the projects undertaken by an entrepreneur,
without having any control over their management.
Moreover, as demonstrated by credit rationing theo-
ry, the asymmetry of information, worsened by the
hands-off management system imposed on external
investors, often causes a shortage of credit that can
worsen the probability of an investment’s success.
Thus, the expectations of failure that are generally
considered from a purely statistical point of view are
worth introducing in the entrepreneurial process. The
integration of the probability of bankruptcy from the
start of any project leads to two key questions. What
means are available in collective proceedings to dis-
tribute the risks among all the actors in a predictable,
fair, and transparent way? What incentive mecha-
nisms do collective proceedings promote to encour-
age economic agents to make sound decisions?
The solutions adopted associate a double objective to
bankruptcy laws. On one hand, they incentivize debtors
and creditors to develop new projects and, on the other
hand, they ensure a good selection of companies by
eliminating from the market those that are performing
poorly while rescuing the others. Bankruptcy law is then
essentially designed to keep businesses going and to
protect the value of the company in the interest of
stakeholders. To achieve this objective, collective pro-
ceedings must avoid competition among creditors and
enable viable businesses with temporary problems to be
filtered out from those with a structurally compromised
future. Two types of efficiency determine the possibility
of reaching these two objectives:
– ex ante efficiency, consisting of encouraging the
economic agents (mainly entrepreneurs and credi-
tors) to make the right decisions to avoid situations
resulting in shortfalls of short-term liquidity and
medium- or long-term insolvency. Here again the
means available for collective proceedings must be
balanced so as not to appear too disadvantageous
and discourage the risk-taking inherent in entrepre-
neurship and the smooth workings of the market
economy.
– ex post efficiency, consisting of liquidating only
non-viable companies and maximizing, or at least
protecting, the value of the company in the interest
6 On the pivotal role of enforcing institution in making regulation
effective, see Marciano et al. (2018).
7 The definition comes from the documentary BDownload^ (2013),
directed by Alex Winter.
8 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The
bankruptcy was then filed under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy
Code with the US Bankruptcy Court in Delaware in 2002.
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of all the stakeholders and of the economy in
general.
Keeping in mind that financing is the first step in any
entrepreneurial project, a number of US commentators
(Baird, 1986; Jackson, 2001; Jackson & Scott, 1989;
Skeel, 1998, 2003) have for a long time argued that the
proper functioning of insolvency law can be used to ease
firms’ financing. From this perspective, the judicial
treatment of economic failure is seen in terms of a single
objective: to maximize the collective return to creditors.
Thus, the bankruptcy procedure is best seen as a
Bcollectivized debt collection device^ and a response
to the Bcommon pool^ problem created when diverse
Bco-owners^ assert rights against a common pool of
assets (Finch 1997, p. 231). Moreover, Jackson (2001)
states that these procedures should be seen as a system
designed to mirror the agreement one would expect
creditors to arrive at where they are able to negotiate
such an agreement ex ante from behind a Bveil of
ignorance^ (Jackson 2001, p. 17). In agreement with
the conclusions of the Law and Economic movement,
Jackson sees the collectivist, compulsory system as
attractive to creditors in reducing strategic costs, increas-
ing the aggregate pool of assets and as administratively
efficient. From the opposite perspective, many other
scholars consider that keeping firms in operation must
be seen as a fundamental objective of bankruptcy laws
(Armstrong and Cerfontaine 2000).
Because of its influence upon the sharing of remain-
ing assets in case of failure, bankruptcy laws affect a
firm’s normal life. When insolvency becomes a possible
option, significant changes to the existing governance
structure occur. As information about the worsening
performance spreads among stakeholders, they modify
their behavior accordingly. In the vicinity of bankruptcy
or when it becomes imperative, shareholders may prefer
risky projects in consideration of their own short-term
interests at the expense of the interests of creditors.
Indeed, they know what is at stake is the money of
creditors and the utmost loss for them is the fixed
amount of share capital, which may be worth nothing
in the case of insolvency. Shareholders may also simply
prefer a quick exit than a long, troubled distress. In
comparison, creditors, especially secured creditors,
may want to realize their collateral as quickly as possible
so that they can invest in other businesses. The result of
such exits, however, is a decrease of the value of the
pool of assets of the company. Employees may also
make underinvestment if they realize that their jobs have
already become unsafe. Alternatively, employees may
be inclined to obtain decent compensation and start their
new life elsewhere rather than remain enmeshed in a
distressed company. Directors attracted by generous
severance compensation packages will at most not in-
terfere to save the troubled business. Or they may sim-
ply continue to operate the business recklessly for the
benefit of shareholders or for their own reputation with-
out due consideration of the interests of creditors. Final-
ly, bankruptcy law also has an influence on which
utilization alternative occurs after insolvency is un-
avoidable: dissolution and sale of the individual assets
of the enterprise, sale of the complete enterprise, or of
parts of the enterprise to a new owner, i.e., to a new legal
personality, or reorganization and continuation of the
enterprise through the existing owners under the old
legal personality.
Bankruptcy laws also concern start-ups or normally
operating companies. Indeed, creditors can make pre-
dictions about the consequences of their decisions prior
to being involved in a run where the winners are the
owners of securitized debts as organized by the law
(Lamoreaux and Rosenthal 2005). As in the case of
disclosure of information, this device was experimented
with at the very beginning of the modern version of
bankruptcy. Modern laws early on organized creditors
as a class, introducing a clear cut between secured and
unsecured debts. The rank of the liabilities determines
the probability and the amount of repayment. However,
the expectations of failure of any potential creditor
makes upon financing a project exert an influence upon
his will to become a creditor and upon the sort of credit
he provides. Bankruptcy law influences howmany cred-
it contracts altogether are entered upon, under which
conditions, and how much money is spent to examine
the creditworthiness of the borrowers. In addition, the
legal framework also influences the concrete use of the
money lent, i.e., the business model and the investment
strategy of the company, as well as the costs the lender is
willing to expend on the control of the ongoing
business.
In general, bankruptcy does not come into being as a
sudden event springing out in a favorable period. On the
contrary, payments disruption can be expected from
signals that empirical works try to identify using either
zeta score-based models or a more qualitative approach.
Empirical evidence does not show a clear causal rela-
tionship between good governance practices and good
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corporate performance mainly because it is almost im-
possible to determine if success results from a favorable
conjuncture or from good practices. However, it is quite
probable that corporate insolvency can be a predictable
result of bad corporate governance when the company is
still a going concern.
Moreover, governance arrangements instituted in
ordinary life can still persist when companies become
distressed. If so, it is very possible that what fits a
safe company may be completely inappropriate for
an endangered firm. For instance, even though cred-
itors are protected collectively in insolvency, the
interests of secured creditors over their collateral or
security are expressly excluded from the collective
distribution scheme. Alternatively, creditors can stip-
ulate in their contracts with the company much
stricter initiating terms than the general requirements
in insolvency law. This form of credit rationing on
terms other than prices is however scarcely studied
from a theoretical point of view. It is precisely in-
formed by surveys implemented by the Central
banks. As a consequence, creditors may intervene in
corporate governance when such terms are satisfied
rather than when rescue efforts will be tried in vain.
Therefore, pre-insolvency contractual arrangements
may penetrate into the control structure around the
invocation of insolvency.
4 Something entrepreneurs should know
on insolvency
Whatever its nature, bankruptcy is accompanied by set
of foreseeable and unexpected consequences that entre-
preneurs and policy makers should know to contribute
to the organization of a performing entrepreneurial sys-
tem. The papers selected for the special issue have in
common the attention paid to the influence of the insti-
tutional and economic framework on bankruptcy and on
the reciprocal relationship since it is clearly established
that the risk of bankruptcy shapes the economy. They
provide empirical evidence on the diversity of the trans-
mission channels thanks to the use of various individual,
local, and national datasets covering different countries
and periods.
A broad and extensive analysis of the interplay
between insolvency regulation and entrepreneurship
is provided by Kun Fu, Karl Wennberg, and Björn
Falkenhall (this issue) in a paper showing that if firm
creation is influenced by corporate bankruptcy laws,
this relationship is different according to the type of
rules and the type of entrepreneurship considered.
The richness of the dataset used and the originality
of the estimation technique implemented combine to
provide robust and original results. Indeed, using
multilevel modeling of approximately 300,000 indi-
viduals in 27 countries over the 2005–2010 period
enables the authors to disentangle the somehow sim-
plistic direct relationship between the legal context
and the propensity of individuals to start a business,
with major attention being paid to the nature of the
entrepreneurial process. The distinction between op-
portunity-driven, necessity-driven, and innovative
entrepreneurship contributes to a better understanding
of the relationship between bankruptcy laws and en-
trepreneurship. When reforming the rules, policy
makers should thus pay attention to the type of entre-
preneurship affected by the changes introduced.
As a complement to this country comparison anal-
ysis, two papers propose a sub-national or local per-
spective. The first one, authored by Alessandro
Melcarne and Giovanni Battista Ramello (this issue),
sheds some light on how the time required by judges
to make their decision on bankruptcy cases may exert
an influence on firm demography. To clarify this
relation, they provide an analysis of bankruptcy de-
lays in 165 Italian first-instance tribunal districts be-
tween 2005 and 2011. Looking at the effective prac-
tices considerably enriches the Blaw in the books^
usual perspective while showing that local socio-
economic factors combined with court organization
contribute to a better explanation of the local levels of
entry and exit rates. This unique mix of legal practices
and entrepreneurial decisions contributes to the liter-
ature by showing that the law does not determine
everything and that, instead, some significant differ-
ences may be noted at the local level.
The importance of the system in which firms are
embedded in determining bankruptcy is also at the
core of the paper by Giuseppe Arcuri and Nadine
Levratto (this issue). Their analysis of a sample of
firms incorporated in Italy between 2008 and 2012
shows that, despite the uniqueness of the formal
institutions such as rules of law, constitutions, and
civil and criminal codes, cross regional differences in
the new firms’ bankruptcy persist over time. They are
mainly caused by the financial context, appreciated
by their two main indicators, i.e., the local financial
Entrepreneurship and failure: two sides of the same coin? 379
development and banking concentration. The fragili-
ty of young companies is a major concern for policy
makers, who tend to promote firm creation to prop up
the local competitiveness and the local labor market.
It is thus all the more important to be aware of the
impact of public expenditures in favor of firm crea-
tion and to have a precise idea of the role of the local
context, information provided by this research.
As decision makers of last resort, entrepreneurs re-
main very responsible for the direction of their business.
Three papers explore this research field.
The article by Marcus Box, Karl Gratzer, and
Xiang Lin (this issue) addresses the dark side of
bankruptcy, that is to say the issue of the fraudulent
behavior of entrepreneurs. Instead of assuming that
entrepreneurs are all worried about the future of
their business and unanimously try to make it suc-
cessful and profitable, the authors introduce the pos-
sibility of deviant behaviors leading to destructive
entrepreneurship. They mainly take the form of
fraudulent bankruptcy, a phenomenon identified
thanks to a comprehensive series on all bankruptcies
and bankruptcy frauds in Sweden during nearly two
hundred years (1830–2010) combined with several
contemporary and historical sources, including ar-
chival materials. The results obtained show that
fraudulent behavior should not be forgotten, that
fraudulent bankruptcies depend on the legal context,
and that destructive entrepreneurship may have ef-
fects on the economic system. This indirect and
often hidden effect of bankruptcy regimes should
merit the attention of legislators whenever they pro-
pose a change in the law, mainly because nothing
can change if the agents primarily targeted by the
reform maintain their deviant behavior.
As clearly stressed formerly, however, cheating
does not motivate all entrepreneurs and bankruptcy
is rarely the outcome of criminal intent. Rather, a
large share of entrepreneurs fight hard to support their
activity during crisis periods, as discussed by the
paper of Marco Cucculelli and Valentina Peruzzi (this
issue). Thanks to empirical analysis of a dataset cov-
ering 67,241 Italian manufacturing firms, this re-
search clarifies the relationship between post-crisis
firm survival, business model changes, and organiza-
tional learning, an explanatory chain that puts some
emphasis on business model changes as a critical
condition of survival. In this process, learning and
firm dynamics are noted as major aspects to be
considered. One may expect that internal incentives
and entrepreneurial motivations matter in determining
which firms are able to make the proper decisions to
capitalize on their weaknesses, making the good de-
cisions to transform their business model and indus-
trial strategy. It is, however, very possible that entre-
preneurs and executive committees should not be
alone when industrial transformation occurs since
some strategies are shown to be less effective than
others in reducing default probability. Business sup-
port organizations should be warned of this risk and
could help in this field too.
Last but not least, entrepreneurs themselves are
not the only ones to be touched by the transforma-
tion and the failure of their business. Employees are
also concerned, as shown by Kristina Nyström in a
paper (this issue) that raises the question of the
capacity and willingness of displaced employees to
create their own business. Whereas many efforts are
devoted to promoting firm creation by employees
fired after a firm closure, this phenomenon is still
barely documented, mainly because of the lack of
available data. Using a unique dataset of matched
employer-employees providing information on en-
trepreneurial ventures started by displaced em-
ployees in Sweden during the period of 2001–
2010, this research makes a great contribution to
the understanding of dismissed employees’ motiva-
tion and shows that all of them are far from equal in
entrepreneurship and that the businesses they launch
are fragile. This result should lead to a rethinking of
policies promoting entrepreneurship as a solution to
unemployment. Taking into consideration the in-
creased rate of failure of this class of entrepreneurs
would lead policy makers to systematically associate
training and other types of support with the firm
creation incentives to secure the candidates and im-
prove their chance of survival.
Contributing to an enriched vision of the nexus
of relationships between failure, bankruptcy, insti-
tutional context, and local characteristics on one
hand and entrepreneurship, firm survival and per-
formance on the other, the articles in this issue
contribute to a better understanding of our entre-
preneurial societies. In addition to their heuristic
contribution, they can also contribute to the imple-
mentation of better and more efficient policies by
integrating bankruptcy as a natural component of
firm and market life.
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